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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Steven Douglas McBride appeals from his conviction for driving under the 
influence and possession of a controlled substance. Specifically, McBride 
challenges the denial of his suppression motion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
The relevant facts as found by the district court in its decision and order 
denying McBride's motion to suppress are as follows: 
At about 8:00 a.m., on January 7, 2010, Lieutenant Stuart Miller 
(Miller) of the Kootenai County Sheriff's Department stopped the 
vehicle in which defendant, Steven McBride (McBride), and Melissa 
Watson (Watson) were traveling. Miller initiated the traffic stop in 
response to a call by the driver of a Waste Management garbage 
truck who had reported a physical domestic altercation between the 
occupants of a red station wagon. Miller testified he was informed 
by dispatch that, " ... there was a physical domestic and the - the 
female had tried several times to get out of the vehicle while the car 
was traveling down the road." Dispatch provided Miller with a 
license plate number (Washington 001 RYC), and upon 
approaching the vehicle, he noted two individuals were in the 
station wagon. After Miller pulled the vehicle over, he observed 
Watson was "riffling [sic] in the back seat feverously [sic] and I 
instructed her to - show me her hands, put her hands up, and uh, 
had the male driver exit the vehicle." While McBride was sitting in 
the driver's seat before being ordered out of the vehicle, "the front 
passenger seat was laid all the way back and [Watson] was sitting 
in the rear seat." 
(R., pp.121-122 (bracketed information and ellipses original, citations to the 
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Preliminary Hearing Transcript omitted). 1) 
Upon speaking with McBride, officers developed the opinion that he was 
"potentially under the influence." (6/01/10 Tr., p.9, L.18 - p.10, L.22.) McBride 
was ultimately arrested and the decision to impound the vehicle was made after 
officers were unable to find a competent driver to remove the vehicle from a 
potentially dangerous location. (See generally 6/01/10 Tr., p.11, L.1 - p.14, 
L.13.) 
The state charged McBride with possession of methamphetamine, driving 
under the influence, possession of marijuana and possession of paraphernalia. 
(R., pp.116-118.) McBride filed a motion to suppress, asserting the warrantless 
search of the car violated his rights. (R, pp.35-36.) Following a hearing, the 
district court took the matter under advisement, ultimately denying the motion to 
suppress in a written order. (R., pp.120-145.) 
McBride entered a conditional guilty plea to a second amended 
information charging him with driving under the influence and possession of a 
controlled substance, retaining his right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress. (R., p.205-209; 12/30/10 Tr., 6, L.1 - 18, L.24.) 
The district court sentenced McBride to five years fixed followed by two 
years indeterminate with the court retaining jurisdiction. (R., pp.221-223; 2/11/11 
Tr., p.52, Ls.6-16.) McBride timely appeals. (Supp. R., pp.67-70.) 
1 There are two clerk's records in this case. The first, certified May12, 2011 and 
consisting of 230 numbered pages, will be cited to simply as "R." The second, 
certified September 1, 2011and consisting of 77 numbered pages, will be cited to 
as "Supp. R." 
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ISSUE 
McBride states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in refusing to suppress evidence discovered 
through a warrantless search of Mr. McBride's vehicle? 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 6.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 




McBride Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Suppression Motion 
A. Introduction 
The district court denied McBride's motion to suppress, finding a lawful 
reason for impounding the vehicle McBride was driving and a valid inventory 
search. (R., p.130-45.) 
McBride argues the district court erred in finding the search of the vehicle 
he was driving was a valid exercise of the "impoundment/inventory search 
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement." (Appellant's brief, 
p.7.) A review of the record, in light of the applicable legal standards, supports 
the district court's conclusion that the impoundment of and subsequent inventory 
search of the vehicle McBride was driving was justified. 
As such, the district court did not err when it denied McBride's motion to 
suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts." State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). The power to assess the 
credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw 
factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 
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102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 
P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). The appellate court also gives deference to any 
implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence. State v. 
Brauch, 133 Idaho 215,218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999). 
C. McBride Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Motion To Suppress Evidence Discovered As Part Of An Inventory Search 
Following The lmpoundment Of The Vehicle He Was Driving 
The Fourth Amendment protects against governmental intrusion upon an 
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 
170, 177 (1984); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). "The ultimate 
standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness." Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973). "[S]earches conducted outside the 
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. Inventory 
searches are one such well-established exception to the warrant requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987); Illinois v. 
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643 (1983); State v. Owen, 143 Idaho 274, 277, 141 
P.3d 1143, 1146 (Ct. App. 2006). Inventory searches respond to the needs to (1) 
protect the owner's property while it remains in police custody, (2) protect the 
state against false claims of lost or stolen property, and (3) protect police from 
potential danger. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1976). 
"[A]n inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to 
discover incriminating evidence." Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 3 (1990). 
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"[l]nventory searches, when conducted in compliance with standard and 
established police procedures and not as a pretext for criminal investigation, do 
not offend Fourth Amendment strictures against unreasonable searches and 
seizures." Owen, 143 Idaho at 277, 141 P.3d at 1146. 
In order for an inventory search to qualify under the exception, the 
vehicle's seizure and initial impoundment must be legal. State v. Weaver, 127 
Idaho 288, 291, 900 P.2d 196, 199 (1995); State v. Foster, 127 Idaho 723, 727, 
905 P .2d 1032, 1036 (Ct. App. 1995). 'The initial decision to impound a vehicle 
that poses a traffic hazard or following the operator's arrest is left to the 
discretion of the officer involved." State v. Smith, 120 Idaho 77, 80, 813 P.2d 
888, 891 (1991 ). Because a vehicle's impoundment is a seizure of property, to 
be legal under the Fourth Amendment, the impoundment must be objectively 
reasonable under all the facts available to the seizing officer. Opperman, 428 
U.S. at 372-73; Weaver, 127 Idaho at 291, 900 P.2d at 199; Foster, 127 Idaho at 
727, 905, P.2d at 1036. 
McBride asserts the impoundment policy utilized by Kootenai County is 
itself unconstitutional because it provides officers with too much discretion in 
determining when to impound a vehicle. (Appellant's brief, p.10.) The district 
court correctly concluded the Kootenai County written order setting forth the 
policy for impounding vehicles is itself a valid directive allowing the officer to 
utilize discretion: 
The Order contemplates that vehicles of arrested drivers be towed; 
but, a deputy may exercise his discretion and locate a competent 
driver where certain facts are present. And, if a deputy opts to 
exercise his discretion and locate a competent driver, that individual 
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must be selected by the owner/operator, must possess a valid 
driver's license, and must have been identified and included in the 
report. One of the reasons a deputy may exercise discretion and 
opt to locate a competent driver is where the vehicle contains 
excessive property making an inventory time-consuming or 
burdensome. The plain meaning of the Order indicates that 
inventories are taken when they are not deemed time-consuming 
or burdensome in a deputy's exercise of discretion. Leaving this 
decision to the discretion of the deputy does not result in 
inventories being illegal under any set of circumstance on one 
hand, nor does it result in the need for and attempt to locate a 
competent driver to evaporate on the other hand. 
(R., pp.142-143 (emphasis original).) 
Here, the officer testified at the motion to suppress that he made the 
decision to impound the vehicle McBride was driving because "the registered 
owner was not on scene of the vehicle, nor was she even in the state or 
immediately accessible." (6/01/10 Tr., p.11, Ls.10-13.) Both the driver of the 
vehicle, McBride, and his passenger were arrested, leaving no other licensed 
drivers on scene to take control of the vehicle. (6/01/10 Tr., p.14, Ls.6-13.) 
It is reasonable to impound a car that would be left in a public location 
when its driver cannot legally remove it. See, e.g., Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 
429 F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 2005) ('The violation of a traffic regulation justifies 
impoundment of a vehicle if the driver is unable to remove the vehicle from a 
public location without continuing its illegal operation."); United States v. 
Gutierrez, 995 F.2d 169, 171 (9th Cir. 1993) ("After determining that neither 
Gutierrez nor Cervantes possessed a valid driver's license, the officers advised 
them that they were free to go, but that they could not drive the Cadillac."); 
United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 785 (1st Cir. 1991) ("Upon 
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ascertaining that neither occupant was properly licensed to drive, the decision 
not to let the vehicle continue on its journey was quintessentially reasonable."). 
Although McBride's mother, the registered owner of the vehicle, testified at 
the suppression hearing, she refused consent to search the vehicle when the 
officer called her and asked for it and instead told him she would travel from 
Washington to pick up the car because she did not want it impounded (6/01/10 
Tr., p.26, Ls.1-25), the district court concluded the officer appropriately utilized 
his discretion in making a safety determination to impound the car after 
unsuccessfully attempting to locate a competent driver who could move the 
vehicle at that time (R., pp.141-142). The owner of the vehicle was at least 45 
minutes away with unclear travel abilities, the driver was arrested, and the 
passenger (who was ultimately arrested) did not provide a valid driver's license. 
(R., pp.123-124, 142.) 
Leaving the vehicle on the onramp to the interstate caused safety 
concerns. (6/01/10 Tr., p.11, Ls.15-17.) Considering the vehicle was parked "on 
the onramp from State Highway 95 to Interstate 90" on a "weekday, at 8 a.m. 
rush-hour traffic," the district court found the officer's decision to impound the 
vehicle reasonable. (R., pp.141-42.) Because the reasons given by the officer 
for utilizing his discretion in impounding the vehicle were objectively reasonable 
under all the facts available to him, and McBride has failed to establish the 
decision to impound was merely a ruse to justify a general rummaging in order to 
discover incriminating evidence, McBride has failed to show error in the 
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determination by the district court that the initial impoundment of the vehicle was 
lawful and reasonable. 
McBride asserts the search of the vehicle he was driving was conducted 
based "on [the officer's] desire to search for evidence of criminal activity." 
(Appellant's brief, p.19.) The district court found valid reasons for the 
impoundment and subsequent inventory search, specifically, the lack of a 
competent driver to remove the vehicle and the danger presented by leaving the 
vehicle parked where it was. An inventory search is improper if an officer acts "in 
bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation." Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 
367, 372 (1987) (emphasis added). See also United States v. Kimes, 246 F.3d 
800, 805 (6th Cir. 2001) (subjective intent irrelevant); United States v. Agofsky, 
20 F.3d 866, 873 (8th Cir. 1994) ("The presence of an investigatory motive, even 
if proven, does not invalidate an otherwise lawful inventory search."). Thus, even 
assuming that the officer acted with a dual purpose, McBride's claim would fail as 
a matter of law. 
McBride next asserts, as he did below, that the actual inventory search 
was invalid because there was no evidence of a county policy specifically 
allowing the search of closed containers. (Appellant's brief, pp.13-19.) This is a 
problem, he claims, because without a policy addressing such, the officer was 
"without any guidance" and "there is no way of knowing if that decision [to open 
the purse] was truly based on a desire to create an accurate inventory or to 
search for evidence of a crime." (Appellant's brief, p.19.) An inventory search 
must be conducted according to either "standardized criteria" or "established 
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routine." Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1990). A standardized, although 
unwritten, policy to open closed containers authorizes the opening of closed 
containers to inventory their contents. United States v. Hawkins, 279 F.3d 83, 
85-86 (1st Cir. 2002). The uncontradicted evidence regarding a policy or routine 
as it relates to containers searched during an inventory search was the officer's 
testimony: 
once a party has been arrested from the vehicle that a full inventory 
including locked compartments will be opened. Uh, all substances 
inside will be identified and secured in a manner uh, for the 
protection of the - the driver of the vehicle and the officer on the 
street and then the vehicle will be towed. 
(2/12/10 Tr. p.40, Ls.4-9.2) The officers followed this established routine when 
the inventory search was conducted. 
"[l]nventory procedures serve to protect an owner's property while it is in 
the custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen or vandalized 
property, and to guard the police from danger." Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 
367, 372 (1987). See also State v. Bray, 122 Idaho 375, 834 P.2d 892 (Ct. App. 
1992). Here, the district court, mindful of the purpose of an inventory search, 
noted the distinction between locked safes or locked suitcases and "loose items 
of clothing, purses and handbags, larger bags, and toiletries" is great as is the 
risk of items being overlooked or misplaced with the latter. (R., p.144.) It makes 
sense to inventory the items located in purses or bags since people often keep 
money and other items of value in such locations to ensure no future claims of 
loss. McBride concedes the items inventoried were not locked but merely 
2 This testimony is from the preliminary hearing, which was considered by the 
district court in the motion to suppress. (See 6/01/10 Tr., p.5, Ls.12-23.) 
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closed. (Appellant's brief, p.18, n.9.) Opening them to record the contents was 
reasonable under the circumstances and consistent with the established routine 
of the department. McBride has failed to show error in the district court's denial 
of his motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment and 
district court's order denying McBride's motion to suppress. 
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